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This study aims to develop a robust methodology for measuring financial performance 
of equity-share schemes. Several studies have investigated various aspects of 
performance of these schemes but no single study has yet measured their performance 
using an objective set of criteria. Four categories of such objective criteria are 
proposed:poverty alleviation; empowerment and participation; institutional 
arrangements and governance; and financial performance. This paper focuses only on 
the financial performance criteria. Recognised indicators of financial performance are 
applied to balance sheet and income statement data provided by four equity-share 
schemes in the Western Cape province. This analysis highlights problems with several 
of the conventional ratios used to measure profitability, solvency and growth when 
they are applied to recently restructured farming enterprises whose ‘empowerment’ 
status attracts exceptionally high levels of debt capital to finance long-term 
investments. To avoid these problems it is recommended that, for equity-share 
schemes, profitability should be measured by the return on assets or dividend return; 
solvency by the debt/asset ratio; liquidity by cash flow projections; growth by changes 
in the (estimated) real value of shares; and workers’ total returns by changes in the 
sum of the real wage bill, capital gains, dividends, interest and other benefits accruing 




Equity-share schemes have been proposed as one means of dealing with the 
relatively slow pace of land and wealth redistribution in South African (SA) 
agriculture. They have also been proposed as a means of dealing with free-
rider problems associated with conventional producer co-operatives and 
collective ownership of resources (Knight et al, 2003). Group ownership is a 
trend that is likely to continue in SOUTH AFRICA because most 
disadvantaged people lack the resources needed to purchase their own land 
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privately. Instead they combine their resources to purchase land collectively 
(Knight et al, 2003). In KwaZulu-Natal, less than 0.5% of commercial farmland 
has been transferred to previously disadvantaged owners each year (Lyne & 
Darroch, 2003:76). Lyne & Darroch (2003:83) attribute this slow pace of land 
reform to the high cost of subdivision and to cash flow problems associated 
with conventional mortgage loans. Under these circumstances, group 
ownership models such as equity-share schemes offer institutional 
arrangements that outperform conventional producer co-operatives and 
communal property associations (CPA’s) (Knight & Lyne, 2002).  
 
These schemes were originally initiated by the private sector in the early 
1990’s. The concept of equity-share schemes is not limited to include only 
farmworkers, but other previously disadvantaged stakeholders, such as 
neighbouring rural communities, as well. The first scheme was based at a fruit 
farm in the Western Cape province. They have since been implemented in the 
wine, fruit, vegetable, olive, cut flowers, dairy and eco-tourism industries 
around SA (Knight & Lyne, 2002). A successful equity-share scheme should 
achieve a variety of goals, including the redistribution of wealth, worker 
empowerment, retaining or attracting quality management, creditworthiness, 
improved worker productivity and power relations, and provision for 
ownership and control to be fully transferred to previously disadvantaged 
shareholders (Knight et al, 2003). To date no single study has comprehensively 
measured the success of equity-share schemes in attaining these goals. 
 
Several studies have investigated particular aspects of performance of these 
schemes. Early studies questioned the success of equity-share schemes based 
on assessments of worker participation, empowerment and institutional 
arrangements. For example, Hall et al (2001) argued that power relations were 
not improved and that gender equality was not promoted. Karaan (2003) 
concluded that equity-share schemes fail from an institutional economics 
perspective due to institutional incompleteness, and Mayson (2003) criticised 
the ability of these schemes to improve tenure security. A study conducted by 
Knight (2003) in the Western Cape showed that many of these concerns had 
been corrected in the more successful projects, especially those with superior 
financial performance. In particular, Knight et al (2003) found positive links 
between financial performance, sound institutional arrangements, effective 
worker empowerment and good management. However, no single study has 
adequately assessed the performance of equity-share schemes in terms of a 
comprehensive set of criteria that objectively measure the broader goals of 
agrarian reform (Mayson, 2003). Mayson (2003) also notes that although 
government has guidance policies on equity-share schemes, the Department 
of Land Affairs (DLA) has not conducted thorough research on these schemes, 
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nor does it have records of the number of schemes currently operating in SA. 
It is therefore difficult to judge whether these schemes do make a useful 
contribution to the land reform programme in South Africa. Lyne et al (1998) 
estimated that about 50 equity-share schemes were in operation in SA in 1998 
but more recent estimates are lacking.  
 
Based on policy and socio-economic issues raised in previous studies, it is 
clear that comprehensive assessment of equity-share schemes requires 
consideration of empowerment, institutional and financial criteria. It is 
important to develop a holistic approach to measuring performance of these 
schemes to gauge, monitor and identify reasons for their success or failure. 
Policy objectives of agrarian reform need to be considered in determining 
their success, and these goals must be included in performance criteria for 
equity-share schemes. Some of the policy objectives set out under the SA land 
policy include equitable distribution of land ownership, the reduction of 
poverty, security of tenure, and empowerment of beneficiaries to improve 
their economic and social well-being (Ministry for Agriculture and Land 
Affairs, 2000:2).  
 
Four categories of criteria are proposed for monitoring the performance of 
equity-share schemes:poverty alleviation; empowerment and participation; 
institutional arrangements and governance; and financial performance. This 
paper focuses only on financial criteria. Application of these criteria is 
demonstrated using financial data gathered from four equity-share schemes in 
the Western Cape in early 2004. The other three categories of criteria will be 
the subject of a forthcoming paper. Section 2 of this paper outlines previous 
work on equity-share schemes. Section 3 proposes a set of financial 
performance criteria, and section 4 illustrates the empirical application of 
these criteria at four case studies in the Western Cape, highlighting problems 
encountered, recommending solutions and suggesting ways of improving 
these criteria in future studies. 
 
2.  PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON EQUITY-SHARE SCHEMES 
 
Eckert et al (1996) view land reform as a process for redistributing property 
incomes (capital gains, dividends and interest from owning property) in 
South Africa where there is a history of uneven land distribution. In their 
study, Eckert et al (1996) examined dividend payouts at Whitehall Farm, an 
equity-share scheme in the Western Cape. They found that very few 
respondents actually understood the term ‘dividend’ but that they did 
understand they would receive a share of the business profits. No dividends 
had been declared at the scheme so changes in consumption or savings 
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patterns could not be measured. The respondents were asked to rank what 
they would do with dividend payments once they received them. Saving was 
the most frequent of items ranked first (35%), housing was second (32%), 
followed by investment in their own businesses (19%) and education (10%). 
Eckert et al (1996) viewed capital growth as an important benefit from equity-
sharing. Their study did not attempt to measure capital growth but rather to 
identify how worker-shareholders would use their money once shares had 
been sold and how they viewed capital growth. In addition, they attempted to 
quantify changes in labour productivity and turnover, job satisfaction and 
income changes but did not focus on other performance criteria such as 
governance and participation. 
 
The Surplus People’s Project (SPP) studied equity-share schemes in 1998 (Fast, 
1999). They identified a number of concerns regarding equity-share schemes 
related to worker participation during establishment, beneficiaries’ 
expectations, power relations between worker-shareholders and the original 
owner, transfer of skills, labour relations, the position of employees who are 
not shareholders, gender issues, tenure security and issues concerning entry 
and exit from a project (Knight & Lyne, 2002). A later study of eight equity-
share schemes conducted by Knight (2003) in the Western Cape showed that 
many of the concerns raised by the SPP had been corrected in the more 
successful projects. Worker-shareholders in these eight schemes had 
purchased net farm assets worth R7 million (measured in constant 2001 
prices) representing 3.5-50% of total shareholding (Knight & Lyne, 2002). 
Shares of ownership and control held by workers are expected to improve 
with the introduction of more generous Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD) grants.  
 
Hall et al (2001) argued that equity-share schemes might be failing to meet the 
objectives of redistributing power and resources. They claim that power 
relations at these schemes do not shift because the workers remain minority 
shareholders and have little say in decision-making processes (Hall et al, 
2001). Knight & Lyne (2002) showed that this was not viewed as a serious 
problem by beneficiaries interviewed in their study of eight schemes in the 
Western Cape. Hall et al (2001) also argue that equity-share schemes fail to 
improve gender equality because shareholding is tied to employment and the 
original Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) was based on one grant 
per household head. With the introduction of LRAD grants, which are made 
o n  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  b a s i s ,  F e r r e r  &  S e malulu (2004) found that women were 
beneficiaries in 50% of all transactions involving a combination of LRAD 
grants and mortgage loans in KwaZulu-Natal during 2002, and were therefore 
more effectively targeted than under the SLAG programme. Knight & Lyne 
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(2002) showed that women made up over 50% of shareholders at 63% of the 
eight projects that they studied.  
 
Karaan (2003) reviewed equity-share schemes from an institutional economics 
perspective and concluded that equity-share schemes are subject to 
institutional incompleteness. This comparison was based on Williamson’s 
(1999 cited by Karaan, 2003) conceptual framework for analysing economic 
institutions and compares equity-share schemes to other private ownership 
models. Equity-share schemes present an alternative to sole proprietorship 
where grants are too small to cover the costs of subdividing farmland for 
individual buyers, let alone finance a meaningful down payment on the 
purchase price of even a relatively small farm. Considering that a large 
majority of farmworkers do not have sufficient means to purchase their own 
land it is perhaps more appropriate to compare equity-share schemes with 
other group ownership models. In this respect, Knight & Lyne (2002) are of 
the opinion that the institutional arrangements of equity-share schemes 
outperform conventional producer co-operatives and CPA’s.  
 
Mayson (2003) assessed the contribution of five types of joint ventures, 
including equity-share schemes, to land reform in SA. His assessment was 
based on their ability to provide independent land tenure security, improve 
access to capital, transfer business and management skills to beneficiaries, 
generate immediate benefits, promote gender equality and change power 
relations between participants (Mayson, 2003). Data were obtained from 
interviews with management and farmworkers at a single equity-share 
scheme, De Kamp Boerdery, in the Western Cape, and with various 
government officials and land reform experts. His study focused mainly on 
empowerment and participation criteria, with some examination of poverty 
alleviation (provision of immediate benefits), and institutional arrangements 
and governance (gender equality and power relations). Mayson (2003) argues 
that equity-share schemes should be viewed as investment schemes and not 
as instruments of land redistribution because they aim to obtain committed 
workers; rather than to transfer land. He concludes that equity-share schemes 
often fail to transfer skills to farmworkers because there is limited time and 
skill to train workers in-house, and gender equality is compromised because 
shareholding is often linked to employment and females are excluded because 
they are not full-time employees. This contrasts with Knight & Lyne’s (2002) 
findings in the Western Cape where women comprised more than half of the 
worker-shareholders at most of the eight schemes studied. Most of these 
schemes made special provision for female representation in their constitutions. 
Lastly, Mayson (2003) cites power relations as a problem because the worker-
shareholders often hold a trivial shareholding, and even where they own a 
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meaningful share, often lack the necessary education and training to contribute 
proportionally to management processes. This emphasises the importance of 
continued skills transfer through training programmes at these schemes. 
 
Knight  et al (2003) identified best institutional practices for equity-share 
schemes in their analysis of case studies in the Western Cape. They related 
financial performance to institutional rules (including governance and 
organisational arrangements), worker empowerment and management 
quality. Some measures of financial performance were excluded from the 
analysis because most of the equity-share schemes surveyed were too new to 
report a full set of financial records. This left seven indicators of financial 
performance reflecting creditworthiness (private financing and collateral), 
liquidity (wages), dividends, capital gains and, from the workers’ perspective, 
improvements in working conditions and housing. Knight et al (2003) 
conclude that sound institutions are built on tradable voting and benefit rights 
assigned in proportion to shareholding. This foundation is facilitated by 
organising the equity-share scheme as a private company (investor-owned 
firm), which offers shareholders well-defined property rights, accommodates 
temporary restrictions on the trading of shares, and establishes legal 
requirements for transparent and accountable management.  
 
Koutroumanidis et al (2004) evaluated the financial performance of rural co-
operatives in Greece using eight financial ratios. Although not a study of 
equity-share schemes this study is relevant to proposing financial measures 
for equity-share schemes. Koutroumanidis et al (2004) measured financial 
performance using categories of efficiency, reliability and management ratios. 
Different subjective weights were assigned to the ratios to simulate four 
scenarios. Each scenario produced an overall financial performance measure 
for each co-operative. In the first scenario the ratios were all weighted equally, 
in the second management ratios were weighted higher, efficiency in the third 
scenario, and reliability in the fourth scenario. Half of the eight ratios 
represented reliability and these were mainly based on aspects of liquidity. 
Similar ratios are proposed in this study to monitor the financial performance 
of equity-share schemes. 
 
Although this paper focuses on only one of four categories of performance 
criteria it is nevertheless important to establish a feasible set of objective 
criteria to assess the financial performance of equity-share schemes. Knight et 
al (2003) attempted to include some financial information in their study but 
they faced the problem, as did others (such as Eckert et al, 1996), that the 
schemes were too new to report a full set of financial records. 
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3. PROPOSED  METHODOLOGY  FOR MEASURING FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Measuring financial performance involves examination of financial statements 
to assess the performance of a business based on its profitability, solvency, 
liquidity, risk, efficiency and growth status. The primary aim is to analyse the 
business’ past and present performance in order to identify strengths and 
weaknesses and to formulate feasible plans for the future (Barry et al, 2000:91). 
Indicators of financial performance over time may also be gained from trends 
in financial ratios, of which the most relevant are discussed further. 
 
Most financial ratios are computed from information presented in the income 
statement and balance sheet. It is important to note that assets in the balance 
sheet are usually valued at historical cost whereas they should be assessed at 
current market value to compute meaningful ratios. This is especially 
important where land represents the largest underlying asset of the business, 
and in times of significant inflation. Ratios have the advantage that acceptable 
levels (norms) have already been developed for different types of businesses 
and provide important indications of the financial health of enterprises and 
their relative performance. Financial ratios should be calculated over 
successive years to observe trends in liquidity, solvency, profitability and 
growth. Table 1 presents financial indicators and norms commonly used to 
assess the performance of a farming business. 
 
Profitability may be measured in absolute terms by net farm income, but this 
cannot be compared between different types of enterprises (Barry et al, 
2000:101). Profitability ratios therefore become more useful as general 
performance indicators. These ratios have a large effect on financing decisions 
(Van Zyl et al, 1999:84). Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
are commonly used to assess profitability of investments in assets and equity 
respectively. These ratios should be used only to compare like businesses or to 
examine trends over time. Dividend return is an alternative to ROA and ROE, 
and is widely used in stock exchanges to measure profitability. 
 
The current ratio is a general measure of liquidity at a point in time and is 
widely used as a measure of a business’ ability to meet its financial 
commitments as they become due (Barry et al, 2000:108). For farm enterprises 
the size of the current ratio is strongly influenced by the point in time at which 
the ratio is calculated because most farm enterprises have long production 
cycles. The interest coverage ratio is a measure of the business’ ability to repay 
debt and, like the current ratio, provides a measure of liquidity at a particular 
point in time (Barry et al, 2000:112).  
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Table  1: Conventional financial indicators for measuring the financial 
performance of farm enterprises 
Measure Ratio/Indicator  Norm1
Profitability    
Rate of return on assets 
(ROA) 
Return on farm assets2/Average farm assets   Exceed real interest rate 
Rate of return on equity 
(ROE) 
Return on farm equity3/Average farm equity  Exceed ROA 
Dividend return  Dividend payment/Share price  >0 
Liquidity    
Current ratio  Current assets/Current liabilities  >1 
Interest coverage ratio  Return on farm assets2/Interest paid  >1 
Solvency    
Debt/Asset ratio  Total liabilities/Total assets  <0.3-0.5 
Leverage Total  liabilities/Farm  equity  <1 
Growth  Absolute & relative change in share value4 
over period 
Should be monitored 
over time 
Workers’ total return  Dividends, capital gains, wages, other 
benefits & interest received by workers 
Should be monitored 
over time 
1 Norms were taken from Barry et al, 2000; Van Zyl et al, 1999; and Kohl, 1992. 
2  = Net farm income from operations (excludes interest, tax, rental payments, and salary paid to management) + 
other net income from farm assets before tax (Van Zyl et al, 1999:86). 
3  = Net farm income from operations – (interest + rental payments + salary paid to management) + other net 
income from farm assets before tax (Van Zyl et al, 1999:86). 
4  = Net asset value/Total number of shares issued. 
 
The debt/asset, equity/asset and leverage ratios are mathematically related so 
it is not necessary to compute all three to gain information on the solvency 
position of the business. High leverage places the business at risk of failure 
because unfavourable events have a larger effect than favourable events 
(Barry et al, 2000:172). As leverage increases, liquidity is placed under pressure 
as credit reserves decrease. The advantage of the debt/asset ratio is that the 
norm remains relatively consistent between different types of businesses 
(Barry et al, 2000:110). The leverage ratio norm varies among different types 
and sizes of businesses (Van Zyl et al, 1999:79). 
 
Growth of the business may be measured by comparing starting equity and 
closing equity over a financial period. In measuring growth of an equity-share 
scheme, this amounts to a change in share value, where share value is 
calculated as the current market net asset value divided by the number of 
shares issued. Growth is therefore measured by capital gains on shares. This 
presents growth in absolute or relative terms and is useful in comparing 
trends over time but not for comparisons between different equity-share 
schemes.  
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The financial performance of the business should also be viewed from the 
worker’s perspective. Apart from the direct financial benefits of acquiring 
equity in the business (e.g. dividends and capital gains) the workers may be 
better able to influence their working conditions. A greater relative worker 
shareholding suggests that workers are more able to influence policy on 
housing, access to basic services, wage levels and leave agreements. Each 
scheme may pay different combinations of these benefits so measures of 
change in workers’ total returns must be used to compare the performance of 
schemes over time. Workers’ total returns includes dividends, capital gains, 
wages, other benefits such as medical aid contributions and other non-cash 
items, and interest received by the workers from loans made to the business. 
 
4.  APPLICATION OF METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Data  collection 
 
A detailed study of seven established equity-share schemes was conducted in 
the Western Cape during February 2004 to test performance criteria proposed 
for empowerment and participation; institutional arrangements and 
governance; and financial performance. Interviews were held with farm 
owners (or managers), the chair of the worker’s trust and ordinary worker-
shareholders. The following section presents only the results obtained for the 
financial performance criteria. Financial statements for 2002 and 2003 were 
obtained from four of the seven farms visited and these were used to compute 
the ratios measuring liquidity, solvency, profitability and growth discussed in 
section 3. Of the four case studies that provided financial records, two had 
been operating as equity-share schemes since 2000, and the others since 1998 
and 2001, respectively. The farms used in the financial analysis were located 
in the Stellenbosch, Piketberg and Lutzville regions of the Western Cape and 
the business activities of these farms included wine grapes (Projects 1 and 3), 
deciduous and citrus fruit (Projects 2 and 4), cut flowers (Project 4) and 
vegetables (Project 3). Three of the case studies operate as private companies 
and one as a partnership. Workers’ relative shareholding exceeds 40% in three 
cases and is ten per cent in the remaining case.  
 
Information needed to calculate the financial ratios is presented in Table 1. In 
addition, the farm manager (who was often the original owner) were asked to 
detail the composition of the workforce and the lowest and highest wage rates 
paid to both skilled and unskilled workers. They were also asked when last 
the land had been valued and to provide dates and values for fixed 
improvements to land. For these projects, land (including fixed improvements) 
accounted for over 80% of the total asset base so (improved) land values were 
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adjusted to current market value using the farm manager’s estimates for 2002 
and 2003. In one case where the farm manager would not provide his own 
estimate, real estate agents in the area were asked for estimates and a land 
valuator with personal knowledge of the particular farm was also contacted. 
Movable assets were valued at book value after depreciation. These values are 
likely to be biased estimates of current market value but movable assets 
accounted for a small share of total asset value. 
 
Knight et al (2003) proposed a model of factors contributing to the performance 
of an equity-share scheme. One of the factors contributing to enterprise 
performance is enterprise choice and market environment. Financial 
performance must therefore be compared to trends in the relevant agricultural 
industries or market environment. The fruit, wine grape and cut flower 
industries have all been negatively affected by significant Rand appreciation 
since 2002. In 2002, citrus prices were expected to increase by ten per cent 
from the previous year due to a weakening Rand (Mabiletsa, 2002). Stander 
(2004) estimates that profitability has since fallen by 20-25% mainly as a result 
of the strengthening Rand. The deciduous fruit industry has experienced 
financial stress as a result of declining net returns caused by weak selling 
practices and low prices due to variable fruit quality; less consistent control; 
climate variability; and low labour quality and productivity (McKenna, 2000). 
Profitability has been declining over the past few years in the cut flower 
industry despite rising fresh flower sales (SAPPEX, 2004). For both Projects 1 
and 3 the vineyards have not yet produced harvests so trends in profitability 
in the wine industry were not relevant to their financial performance over the 
study period (2002 and 2003). Project 3 also produced vegetables, which are 
characterised by highly variable net incomes. 
 
4.2 Results  and  discussion 
 
Table 2 presents the financial ratios calculated for four equity-share schemes 
in the Western Cape for the years ended 2003 and 2002. Asset values used to 
calculate profitability at Project 1 were based on end of year values and not 
average values as this project was still in its second year of operation. For the 
remaining projects, profitability ratios could be calculated only for the year 
ended 2003 because asset values were not available for 2001. Likewise, 
information about dividend payouts was available only for 2003. Absolute 
values for growth, workers’ total return and wages presented in Table 2 were 
not estimated in real terms because data were available only for 2003. In 
future studies these measures should be expressed in real terms if the data are 
to be examined over a longer period of time. In general the overall financial 
performance of these four equity-share schemes during 2002 and 2003 was 
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poor compared to the generally accepted norms presented in Table 1. Poor 
performance was primarily a reflection of adverse market conditions for their 
main crop enterprises. 
 
Table 2: Financial indicators for four equity-share schemes in the Western 
Cape for the periods 2002 and 2003 
  Project 1  Project 2  Project 3  Project 4 






Deciduous fruit & 
cut flowers 
Year of establishment  2001  2000  1998  2000 
Financial  year  2003 2003 2002  2003  2002 2003 2002 
Profitability          
Net farm income   -R575799 -R394875 -R374463 -R2582650  R359771  R553212 -R725737 
Rate of return on assets (%)  -20.31 -132.3  2 -20.6  2 5.00  2
Rate of return on equity (%)  -41.6  N/A    N/A    -32.4   
Dividend  return  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 
Liquidity          
Current ratio  0.001  0.720 0.421 0.059  0.353 0.394 0.266 
Interest coverage ratio  N/A3 -7.242 -9.950 -3.038  0.701  1.497 -4.152 
Solvency          
Debt/Asset ratio  0.513 2.090 2.375 1.222  1.127 1.043 1.059 
Leverage 1.053  -1.917  -1.727  -5.514  -8.904  -31.311  -23.610 
Growth (per share)           
Absolute  4 -R4510    -R16550    R1452   
Relative  4 0.015    0.007    -0.003   
Workers’ total return5 R99000 R20581    -R37987    R611524   
Dividends R99000  0    0    0   
Capital gains to workers  0  -R315712    -R661987    R14524   
Total wage bill  06 R336293    R624000    R597000   
Interest received  0  0    0    0   
Wages (per month)             
Lowest wage paid to 
unskilled worker 
0 R6507   R650    R650   
1 End of year asset and equity values were used, as no 2002 data were available. 
2 ROA and ROE could not be calculated for 2002 because asset and equity values were not available for 2001. 
3 This business paid no interest in 2003 on its loan accounts. 
4 Business in first year of operation so no growth estimates could be made. 
5 Workers’ total return = Total wages for the year + total dividends + total capital gains + interest received. 
6 Wages were not presented in the financial statements of the equity-share scheme business. 
7 Minimum wage is R650 per month for farmworkers in rural areas far from urban job markets (and R800 for 
those closer to urban areas) (Department of Labour, 2004). 
 
Financial ratios should be differentiated into those that may be used for 
comparisons between schemes and those for monitoring the performance of a 
particular scheme. Ratios for monitoring the performance of equity-share 
schemes over time are leverage, profitability (ROA, ROE and dividend 
return), growth and workers’ total return. Workers’ total return should be 
examined over time, as there are no generally accepted norms for these ratios.  
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Some difficulties were encountered when estimating profitability at these 
projects. The ROE ratio implicitly assumes that equity is positive and is not 
suitable where a business experiences fluctuations in equity from positive to 
negative (or vice versa) because the returns will become infinite as equity 
approaches zero. This may be the case in new businesses where equity is low 
and the business experiences a net farming loss. A further problem occurs 
when the business experiences net farm losses and negative equity 
simultaneously because ROE becomes mathematically positive. The ROE 
values presented in Table 2 show this problem clearly because Projects 2-4 
experienced farm losses and negative equity values which create the 
misleading impression of high returns to equity.  
 
In some cases equity levels are low because investors inject capital as loans 
which are grouped with other liabilities in the balance sheet. As a result, 
equity levels are small and tend to become negative in times of financial 
stress. Project 3 is one such case because workers’ equity is reported in the 
balance sheet as a loan from the SA Wine Industry Trust (SAWIT). While it is 
understandable that cash-strapped and risk-averse investors might prefer to 
inject their capital as loans rather than as equity, this practice seriously 
undermines the creditworthiness of a scheme. The fact that commercial banks 
granted loans to Project 3 (and others like it) shows that they are willing to 
finance ‘black economic empowerment projects’ with solvency ratios that fall 
well short of recommended norms. Consequently, in cases where the original 
owner or workers inject capital through loan accounts, the norms for 
profitability and solvency cannot be meaningfully applied. One ‘solution’ is to 
treat these loans as equity when computing the financial ratios. Apart from 
generating contrived indicators, this approach may not always be possible 
because audited balance sheets seldom distinguish between ‘disguised’ equity 
and other genuine loans. The ratios at Project 3 were not adjusted for 
‘disguised’ equity. Considering the distortions created in ROE, it may be more 
appropriate to use the dividend return as an alternative measure of 
profitability. Dividends cannot be declared when equity is zero or negative so 
the dividend return will tend to have a lower limit of zero. 
 
Likewise, ROA is a more appropriate measure of profitability than ROE 
because asset values will always be non-negative. Current market values for 
( i m p r o v e d )  l a n d  m u s t  b e  u s e d  w h e n  calculating ROA and the debt/asset 
ratio. Negative ROA, caused by large farm losses, is still a meaningful 
measure of profitability. Project 4 had a positive ROA that was more or less 
equal to the average real interest rate of 5.36% for February 2002-February 
2003 (SA Reserve Bank, 2004). Although the return to investment for Project 4 
is positive, its debt/asset ratio of 1.043 for 2003 is not sustainable given the 
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ROA and cost of debt (COD) for 2003, where the COD was taken as a nominal 
interest rate of 15.36%. At these levels the sustainable debt/asset ratio for this 
project is approximately 0.333 (33.3%). ROA is negative for the other three 
projects. If this situation persists, their debt/asset ratios will climb and lenders 
will be forced to question their solvency.  
 
Both the debt/asset and leverage ratios indicate solvency but the leverage 
ratio implicitly assumes positive equity values. Table 2 illustrates the problem 
where meaningless leverage values are obtained for businesses that 
experience negative equity. The application of the leverage ratio is therefore 
limited to (established) businesses with positive equity. Solvency ratios also 
become distorted when equity is disguised as debt capital (e.g. Project 3) or 
when assets and liabilities are not reported on the same balance sheet. It is 
conceivable that this may happen when a business forms part of a larger 
group of companies. In either instance, the norms cannot be applied 
meaningfully to the solvency ratios and their use should be confined to 
monitoring changes in a particular scheme’s solvency over time. The 
debt/asset ratio has the advantage of producing meaningful indicators when 
equity is negative. 
 
The current ratio is not affected by negative equity but its norm may not be 
applicable to new farming enterprises where crops require long-term 
investment before the first harvest. This problem is well illustrated by Project 
1, a wine grape farm. This business was established in 2001 and does not 
expect its first harvest until 2004. As a result, the current ratio computed at the 
end of 2003 falls far short of the recommended norm. In such cases it is 
reasonable to assume that investors had planned for the cash flow problem 
and that the current ratio should be monitored but not yet compared with its 
norm. The interest coverage ratio is an alternative to the current ratio but both 
ratios suffer from the problem that they are static. Consideration must be 
given to the time of year when the ratios are computed. For example, the 
ratios change significantly depending on whether they are computed pre- or 
post-harvest. Project 1 illustrates this, where the current ratio was computed 
before the first harvest. Adequate assessment of liquidity in these 
circumstances really requires cash flow projections. 
  
Table 2 reports growth measured in terms of absolute and relative capital 
gains per share. Again, negative equity renders the relative measures 
meaningless in Projects 2 and 3, suggesting that attention should rather be 
focused on the absolute measures. These absolute measures of growth should 
not be used to compare between schemes, but rather to track changes in 
growth over a period of time. Early losses at Projects 2 and 3 resulted in 
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negative growth during 2003 when producers of export crops felt the full 
effect of an appreciating Rand. 
 
Workers’ total return measures financial benefits viewed from the workers’ 
perspective. The objective of the measure is to determine if their real 
aggregate earnings improve as the equity-sharing arrangement matures. This 
measure should account for income from wages, dividends, capital gains, 
other benefits such as medical aid contributions and other non-cash items, and 
interest received from lending to the business. The questionnaires used in the 
2004 study did not require respondents to assign monetary values to ‘other’ 
benefits so they were not reported. In future, respondents should be asked to 
assign monetary values to these benefits. None of the projects had declared 
dividends or paid interest to workers (interest earned on the SAWIT loan 
accrued to SAWIT and not the workers). The workers’ total return estimates 
listed in Table 2 cannot be meaningfully interpreted until further time series 
data are available. Nevertheless, large (unrealised) losses in equity at Project 3 
resulted in a negative estimate for workers’ total return. 
 
It is likely that workers’ ability to influence working conditions will increase 
as their joint share of total equity increases. At the same time, their incentive 
to demand higher wages is likely to diminish because their share of profits 
also grows with increased shareholding. Worker-shareholding exceeded 40% 
of total equity at three of the four projects discussed in this paper. There had 
been no demands for higher wages since 2001 at two of these three projects 
and at the third project wage disputes were settled by introducing a system 
where workers determined standards including an acceptable level of 
absenteeism and completion of skills training courses to qualify for a wage 
increase. At all four of the projects the majority of workers said that they felt 
the ability to influence working conditions was a direct result of acquiring 
shares in the scheme. The majority of respondents rated this ability as being a 
very important benefit of equity-sharing. This is consistent with Knight & 
Lyne’s (2002) findings where most of the trustees interviewed (88%) felt 
confident that they could influence wage conditions if they chose to. Knight & 
Lyne (2002) also found that worker-shareholders realised that demands for 
higher wages could jeopardise the profits of the business so they chose not to 
demand higher wages.  
 
Knight et al (2003) found that only one out of the nine projects they studied 
had declared dividends during 2001. Mayson (2003) criticised the ability of 
equity-share schemes to provide immediate benefits to worker-shareholders 
in the form of, for example, dividend payouts and additional housing benefits. 
Mayson (2003) argued that worker commitment to schemes that do not 
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provide immediate benefits would decline substantially. Although none of the 
four projects investigated in this study were able to declare dividends, the 
majority shareholders of Project 1 financed a ‘dividend’ of R1,000 per worker 
from their own pockets. These payments amounted to R99,000 and show a 
strong commitment to the project. Fast (1999) suggests that visible benefits 
should be built into every year of the financial plan and that these may 
include activities such as cash crop production and the setting aside of 
additional productive land for the private use of shareholders. At three of the 
four projects workers are given an additional piece of land on which they may 
grow their own crops or plant trees. This was not feasible at the fourth 
(remaining) project because workers reside off-farm. Instead, the workers are 
allowed to take crops for their own use with permission from the manager. 
 
Capital gains accruing to workers reflect the real gain or loss in the value of 
equity held by all workers. Project 1 was in its first year of operation so capital 
gains were not estimated. Capital gains were estimated from annual changes 
in the audited net value of assets and therefore measure unrealised gains or 
losses. Workers are unlikely to realise losses unless they leave the scheme. 
Nevertheless, they should be made aware of changes in the value of their 
shares so that they may make informed decisions concerning their investment 
portfolios. 
 
Other monetary benefits accruing to worker-shareholders included 
unemployment benefits through company contributions to the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (UIF) and pension contributions. Some of these benefits (e.g. 
UIF) were in existence before the equity-share scheme was established. Other 
non-monetary benefits common to all four projects, as perceived by the 
workers, were improved tenure security, ability to influence wages and 
working conditions, secure employment, improved sanitation, access to 




Financial ratios are a useful means for objective measurement of the financial 
performance of equity-share schemes. The aim of this paper was not to assess 
the performance of equity-share schemes but to propose a feasible set of 
indicators to gauge and monitor the financial performance of these schemes. 
To accomplish this, ratios typically recommended to measure the profitability, 
liquidity, solvency and growth of an enterprise were applied to financial data 
supplied by four equity-share schemes in the Western Cape province in 2004. 
This empirical analysis showed that certain financial ratios and conventionally 
applied norms are inappropriate for assessing the financial performance of 
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farms recently restructured as equity-share schemes. Problems arise because 
equity often accounts for a small share of the capital invested by these 
empowerment projects, and investments tend to be in long-term crops with 
high establishment costs and low initial returns. When compounded by 
adverse market conditions, large losses made during the early years reduce 
equity to near-zero or even negative levels, rendering many financial 
performance ratios or their norms meaningless. The practice of ‘disguising’ 
equity as loans aggravates this problem. 
 
For newly established equity-share schemes, dividend return and return on 
assets are better measures of profitability than return on equity as they do not 
rely on positive equity. For the same reason, the debt/asset ratio is preferred 
to the leverage ratio as a measure of solvency, and growth is better measured 
by absolute rather than relative changes in the real value of shares (estimated 
by net asset value). The apparent willingness of commercial banks to finance 
empowerment projects even though they are highly leveraged suggests that 
the debt/asset ratio and current or coverage ratio should not be compared 
with recommended norms but rather monitored to gauge the performance of 
a particular project over time. Likewise, absolute measures of growth cannot 
be used to compare the performance of different equity-share schemes. Cash 
flow projections might give a better assessment of liquidity than either the 
current or coverage ratio for newly established farm enterprises. 
  
From society’s perspective, the financial performance of a project could also 
be measured by changes in the real aggregate earnings of its workers over 
time. It is recommended that workers’ total returns be computed by summing 
the wage bill, capital gains, dividends, interest and monetary value of any 
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